Thirteen Days, pgs. 89-106 Summary and Analysis

RFK often thinks afterward about how the crisis must be handled secretly, privately, and swiftly - but not immediately. A 24-hour decision would have been far riskier. They are able to debate and gather a spectrum of views. Presidents often hear unanimous viewpoints from cowering advisers. They have virtual unanimity over the Bay of Pigs - or if top officials disagree, they do not express it. RFK suggests having a "devil's advocate," but at the time of the Cuban missile crisis one is not needed. U.S. international commitments have grown so complex and the nation so powerful that the Secretary of State can no longer do everything alone, and, unlike 30 years earlier, other agencies and departments have strong interests in foreign affairs. Representatives of the Pentagon, CIA, AIAD, USIA, Peace Corps, Export-Import Bank, and...