The Logic of Scientific Discovery by Karl Popper is an analysis of scientific thinking through his particular view of epistemology. Popper is a well-known philosopher of science. In this work, he investigates where scientific findings fit into philosophy through examining what differentiates true knowledge from false knowledge. He claims this quest is far more than language analysis or reductionism, relying instead on the relationship of basic statements and the notion of "falsifiability" to sustain rational analytical processes in the growth of knowledge.

Science is about putting forward and testing theories. Falsifiability figures prominently as Popper's method for testing theories. He repeatedly shows that theories are never verifiable, only falsifiable. Concepts of universality and singularity help to define falsifiability. Singular statements, or occurrences, are subsets of universal events. Basic statements are particular types of singular statement that can serve as a basis to empirically falsify theories. They can be used to falsify a hypothesis "if two non-empty classes of basic statements exist such that one contains statements that would lead to rejecting the hypothesis while the other class contains all other basic statements." Using this approach, Popper labels hypotheses as either empirical statements or non-empirical statements depending upon the degree to which they are corroborated. Corroboration is based upon tests to a theory's basic singular statements. The demarcation between empirical and non-empirical theories is a key element in Popper's logic about what properly constitutes scientific methodology.

Popper directly and repeatedly rejects induction as a viable scientific method. The inductive method is one through which universal statements can be inferred from singular statements. In disputing the logic of deriving theory from induction, he shows how inductive reasoning leads to infinite regression or to tautologies. Popper finds inductive logic internally inconsistent. Instead, he supports deductive reasoning as empirically scientific. Deductive systems avoid many of the pitfalls of metaphysical thinking and psychologism by requiring continued testing for falsifiability.

Positivism falls under Popper's attack for lacking intersubjectivity and for circular, or tautological, thinking. Returning again to the merits of falsifiability, Popper shows how the positivist method to show verification of a statement's "meaningfulness" is inductive and should therefore be disregarded. Further, he takes on conventionalists. He claims they cling to the idea of simple basic laws of nature that are created in the human mind. These laws serve as the logical construction of nature from which humans can think about science. This basic difference in the premise causes Popper to refute conventionalism for inappropriately solidifying accepted scientific theories with ad hoc hypotheses that protect well-accepted theories unless they are actually falsified. Popper claims that conventionalism cripples scientific growth and discovery that would be better served by the premise of empirical falsification.

Popper tests the application of his principles on problems associated with probability. While stating that probability statements cannot be falsified, he suggests that excluding statements of extreme improbability will suffice for empirical results through what he calls "reproducible physical effects." He also applies falsifiability to problems of simplicity and quantum theory in an attempt to test his ideas and stretch the applicability of his theoretical constructs. In the appendices to this book, Popper further develops mathematical solutions in support of his theories. He also shares some of the correspondence and criticisms he has received about his ideas, including one from Albert Einstein.