"Projectivism" has its roots in David Hume's remark in the Treatise about the mind's "propensity to spread itself over external objects." We sometimes speak of properties of objects where in fact the features we notice are "projections" of our internal sentiments (or other qualities of our experience). The family of metaethical views claiming that value is a projection of our conative and affective physiological states is called projectivism by Simon Blackburn (1984), and the name has stuck. Blackburn proposes that "we say that [we] project an attitude or habit or other commitment which is not descriptive onto the world, when we speak and think as though there were a property of things which our sayings describe, which we can reason about, know about, be wrong about, and so on" (1984, pp. 170–171). In ethics projectivism is popular because it provides an explanation of how it is that moral judgment can have...