This section contains 627 words (approx. 3 pages at 300 words per page) |
A major focus of post-Gricean pragmatics is the role that pragmatic inference plays in determining the explicit content of utterances (as opposed to their conversational implicatures). As well as disambiguation and reference fixing, there are pragmatic processes of propositional completion, as in the examples in (1), and, more controversially, processes of "free" enrichment, as in (2):
(1) | a. | It's too late. | [for what?] |
b. | Cotton is better. | [than what?] | |
(2) | a. | I've had breakfast. | [today] |
b. | John's car hit Tom's and Tom stopped illegally. | [causal relation] |
The pragmatic completions in (1) are mandated by aspects of the linguistic semantics of the sentences, specifically by the lexical items too and better. However, this does not seem to be the case for the examples in (2), which express complete, truth-evaluable propositions without the bracketed addition. These pragmatic inferences seem to be entirely pragmatically motivated (i.e., "free" from linguistic indication); they are undertaken in...
This section contains 627 words (approx. 3 pages at 300 words per page) |