The arguments against immortality on offer at the beginning of the twenty-first century are essentially those discussed by Professor Flew in the first edition of this reference work and will only be summarized here, following which we will consider non-traditional conceptions of immortality, and arguments in support of immortality. Four principal arguments have been presented against immortality: (1) The notion of a disembodied person is incoherent: to be a person just is to be embodied. (2) Advances in neuroscience have led to increased understanding of the brain and support physicalist theories in philosophy of mind. Physicalism (and a fortiori philosophical naturalism) denies the existence of an immaterial soul. The dependence of the mind on the functioning brain then grounds a formidable argument against the possibility of surviving the dissolution of the brain. (3) Determining identity conditions that would enable us meaningfully to assert that a particular disembodied soul was...