Euthyphro's dilemma?

Essentially, the dilemma faced by Euthyphro is this: If it is maintained that certain actions and dispositions are good simply because God favours them, then it seems that the distinction between good and evil, right and wrong, is purely arbitrary; for no reason can be given why God should favour one kind of action rather than another. The distinction is solely a matter of God's `taste', just as it is a matter of my taste that I prefer prawns to oysters. As no reason can be given why God should favour, say, justice and kindness, he might equally have favoured their opposites. In which case injustice and cruelty would be morally right and good.

Furthermore, if the distinction between good and evil is arbitrary it seems that the only way we can come to know what actions are right or wrong is by divine revelation. But surely we can know, for example, that cruelty is wrong independently of any reference to what God has revealed. Also, the person whose moral life consists in blindly following what he or she takes to be moral rules revealed by God is morally immature, just as the child who sticks rigidly to the rules of a game without ever asking what those rules are for is immature.

The consequences of accepting that the goodness of actions consists simply in the fact that God favours them are obviously disagreeable. However, the consequences of accepting the alternative also appear unfortunate. If it is maintained that God favours certain actions because they are objectively good, it seems that their goodness is independent of His will. But such a view appears to be inconsistent with the conception of God as the omnipotent creator and sustainer of all that is. It means that there is a realm of moral values which exist quite apart from God's creative will and to which His will must conform. Such a view must inevitably appear blasphemous to all those who believe in God, for it makes God out to be less than He is.