On the 31st, General Wilson’s division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy’s cavalry.  General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith’s command, which had just arrived, via White House, from General Butler’s army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the 6th corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders.  This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy’s first line of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of General Smith.  During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.  That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed.  The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d.  On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy’s works, in the hope of driving him from his position.  In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light.  It was the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses.  I would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the city.  I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the James.  While the former might have been better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the James.  My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee’s army north of Richmond, if possible.  Then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat.  After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had.  He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily