I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant’s report, Appendix.

(25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VA., April 9, 1864.

MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE
Com’d’g Army of the Potomac.

For information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially for your own perusal alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre.  Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to move on Mobile.  This he is to do without reference to other movements.  From the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if so soon.  Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo.  Johnston’s army being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim.  If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front.  This he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it.  Two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under Brig.-General Crook.  The former of these will endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join you.  The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward to join Ord.  The cavalry from Ord’s command will try tributaries would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the James River.  But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in following.  A movement by his left—­our right—­would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with.  All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered.  The country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us.