strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify.  General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess’s Mills.  Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy’s lines.  The two latter reported favorably.  The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct.  I determined, therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy’s right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy’s lines.  The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this.  The enemy’s intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment’s run from one to the other.  Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys’s corps, to report to General Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement.  On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so.  To accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked.  A division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained.  Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards Dinwiddie Court House.  Here General Sheridan displayed great generalship.  Instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses.  This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow.  At this juncture he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie Court House.  General Mackenzie’s cavalry and one division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.  Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisions of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once.  Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements.  On the morning of the 1st of April, General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five and six thousand prisoners.