Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive Hood.  The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and Chattanooga.  Thomas had previously given up Decatur and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith’s two divisions just returned from Missouri.  He also had Steedman’s division and R. S. Granger’s, which he had drawn from the front.  His quartermaster’s men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, General J. L. Donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general supervision of General Z. B. Tower, of the United States Engineers.

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that place almost without interference.  Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe against the attack of Hood.  He had troops enough even to annihilate him in the open field.  To me his delay was unaccountable—­sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications.  It is true the weather was very bad.  The rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move.  But I was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas and manage to get north of the Cumberland River.  If he did this, I apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head him off if he got there, General Thomas’s movements being always so deliberate and so slow, though effective in defence.

I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from City Point(41) to make the attack at once.  The country was alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing would take place which I have just described that is, Hood would get north.  It was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from Thomas saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making preparations, etc.  At last I had to say to General Thomas that I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly.  He replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could.

General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and knowing him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave him an order to proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas.  I directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomas had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph.  After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I became restless, and concluded to go myself.  I went as far as Washington City, when a dispatch was received from General Thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of his movement.  I concluded to wait until that time.  He did move, and was successful from the start.  This was on the 15th of December.  General Logan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther himself.