be necessarily consumed in reaching Corse, would be so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead.  Corse was a man who would never surrender.  From a high position some of Sherman’s signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block house at Allatoona.  It was from Corse.  He had been shot through the face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his post at all hazards.  It was at this point probably, that Sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the North would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond Atlanta.  He proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned.  Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field.

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky.  I, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did.  On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed:  that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga.  To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him.  In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with two divisions of Sherman’s army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving the enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there long before Hood could reach Nashville.

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in the North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped.  Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at Chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro, and Florence.  There were already with him in Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster’s and other departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville, for its defence.  Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field.  Thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated.  These reinforcements gave him altogether about seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new levies already spoken of.