to him that with the army he then had it would be impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any force whatever with which to take the offensive.  Had that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and Mr. Davis’s prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or else Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which Mr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman.  He took advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to break his communications.  Something else had to be done:  and to Sherman’s sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that something else should be.

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows: 

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 10, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced.  We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war.  If we give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant.  Now that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but it will be the best move to transfer Canby’s troops to act upon Savannah, whilst you move on Augusta.  I should like to hear from you, however, in this matter.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Sherman replied promptly: 

“If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. * * * If you can manage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of Georgia.”

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a letter inviting Sherman’s views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Division of the
Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this.  Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I can do in the limits of a letter.  Although I feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly.  My lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road.  This line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate.  I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville Road cut.  At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.