I then wrote out General Hunter’s instructions. (39) I told him that Sheridan was in Washington, and still another division was on its way; and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at any point that would suit him best, Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere, and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field.  The general replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely.  He said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there.  He did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the army.  There were not many major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed.  I told him, “very well then,” and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there.

Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the troops were all off.  I went to the station and remained there until he arrived.  Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Union people, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at the Monocacy when Sheridan arrived.  I hastily told Sheridan what had been done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the written instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter and directed to that officer.

Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being cavalry.  Early had about the same number, but the superior ability of the National commander over the Confederate commander was so great that all the latter’s advantage of being on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this circumstance.  As I had predicted, Early was soon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and Maryland were speedily freed from the invaders.  The importance of the valley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces about his capital.  I therefore gave orders for another move to the north side of the James River, to threaten Richmond.  Hancock’s corps, part of the 10th corps under Birney, and Gregg’s division of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the 13th-14th of August.  A threatening position was maintained for a number of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present themselves which would insure great success.  General Meade was left in command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side.  There was no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the valley.