The effort was a stupendous failure.  It cost us about four thousand men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault.

After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that most of that part of Lee’s army which had been drawn north of the James River were still there, I gave Meade directions to send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next morning, before Lee could get his forces back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon Railroad.  But misfortunes never come singly.  I learned during that same afternoon that Wright’s pursuit of Early was feeble because of the constant and contrary orders he had been receiving from Washington, while I was cut off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across Chesapeake Bay being broken.  Early, however, was not aware of the fact that Wright was not pursuing until he had reached Strasburg.  Finding that he was not pursued he turned back to Winchester, where Crook was stationed with a small force, and drove him out.  He then pushed north until he had reached the Potomac, then he sent McCausland across to Chambersburg, Pa., to destroy that town.  Chambersburg was a purely defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet McCausland, under Early’s orders, burned the place and left about three hundred families houseless.  This occurred on the 30th of July.  I rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the Weldon Railroad, and directed them to embark for Washington City.  After burning Chambersburg McCausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards Cumberland.  They were met and defeated by General Kelley and driven into Virginia.

The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because it was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about Richmond.  It was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it.  It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from Washington.

It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost.  They were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania.  I determined to put a stop to this.  I started Sheridan at once for that field of operation, and on the following day sent another division of his cavalry.

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, but Mr. Stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so important a command.  On the 1st of August when I sent reinforcements for the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders: