every engagement, and by a portion of the press North with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his troops and to make him feared by his antagonists.  It was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers, “Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet.”  There were good and true officers who believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia was superior to the Army of the Potomac man to man.  I do not believe so, except as the advantages spoken of above made them so.  Before the end I believe the difference was the other way.  The Army of Northern Virginia became despondent and saw the end.  It did not please them.  The National army saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it.

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th of June.  Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon bridges and crossing the river.  As already stated, I had previously ordered General Butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent Confederate gunboats from coming down the river.  Butler had had these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my arrival.  I ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in ferrying the troops across.

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to see General Butler for the purpose of directing a movement against Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomac were crossing.

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way of White House, thence on steamers to City Point for the purpose of giving General Butler more troops with which to accomplish this result.  General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army of the James.  He gave Smith about six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-five hundred colored infantry under Hinks.

The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy’s lines was about six miles, and the Confederate advance line of works was but two miles outside of Petersburg.  Smith was to move under cover of night, up close to the enemy’s works, and assault as soon as he could after daylight.  I believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg could have been easily captured at that time.  It only had about 2,500 men in the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency.  Smith started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intrenched between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg.  This position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from there.  While there I informed General Butler that Hancock’s corps would cross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case the latter was successful, and that I could reinforce there more rapidly than Lee could reinforce from his position.