When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac, including Burnside’s—­which was a separate command until the 24th of May when it was incorporated with the main army—­numbered about 116,000 men.  During the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received.  At the crossing of the James River June 14th-15th the army numbered about 115,000.  Besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of six weeks’ nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about one-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men were discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* In estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all.  Operating in an enemy’s country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads leading to our flanks and rear.  We were also operating in a country unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads accurately.

The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially.  In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account, never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets (36) or carbines.  Generally the latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one field.  Officers and details of enlisted men are not included.  In the Northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected with the army and drawing pay.

Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than 80,000 men at the start.  His reinforcements were about equal to ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back.  He was on the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was familiar to him and his army.  The citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every move.  Rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required.  All circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers.

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all these contests, was a very highly estimated man in the Confederate army and States, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the people and press of the Northern States.  His praise was sounded throughout the entire North after every action he was engaged in:  the number of his forces was always lowered and that of the National forces exaggerated.  He was a large, austere man, and I judge difficult of approach to his subordinates.  To be extolled by the entire press of the South after