I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made.  I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg.  At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained.  Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side.  Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac.  They no longer wanted to fight them “one Confederate to five Yanks.”  Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field.  They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac.  This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration.  The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse.  When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg.  We were in a Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season.  The Army of the Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks.  They had driven a portion of that army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf.  They had attacked another portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and small arms:  they had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi, with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures.  Only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first at Champion’s Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition.  The Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances.  There was no telling how long a regular siege might last.  As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a Southern climate.  There was no telling what the casualties might be among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun.  If Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with.  These are reasons justifying the assault.  The only benefit we gained—­and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice—­was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out.  Had the assault not been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort.