right.  He formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the Po and get on the enemy’s flank.  The fourth division of Hancock’s corps, Mott commanding, was left at Todd’s when the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the left of Sedgwick’s—­now Wright’s—­6th corps.  In the morning General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters.  His loss was a severe one to the Army of the Potomac and to the Nation.  General H. G. Wright succeeded him in the command of his corps.

Hancock was now, nine P.M. of the 9th of May, across the left flank of Lee’s army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of Meade’s army, by the Po River.  But for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at Wooden Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe.

The Po at the points where Hancock’s corps crossed runs nearly due east.  Just below his lower crossing—­the troops crossed at three points—­it turns due south, and after passing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction.  During the night this corps built three bridges over the Po; but these were in rear.

The position assumed by Hancock’s corps forced Lee to reinforce his left during the night.  Accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when Hancock renewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, he found himself confronted by some of Early’s command, which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy during the night.  He succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no more were crossed.

Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be gained.  The enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery.  Anderson’s left rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore, for Hancock to cross over—­although it would bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of the army—­would still farther isolate him from it.  The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body.  The idea of crossing was therefore abandoned.

Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of Hancock’s, and I determined to take advantage of it.  Accordingly in the morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre by Warren’s and Wright’s corps, Hancock to command all the attacking force.  Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Po.  Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as a reserve.  Barlow’s division was left south of the stream, and Mott of the same corps was still to the left of