of a mile.  The killed, and many of the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was impossible to reach them.  The woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the conflagration raged.  The wounded who had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death.  Finally the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places.  Being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury.  But the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer.

Lee was now in distress.  His men were in confusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore order.  These facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success.  His troops were withdrawn now, but I revoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, for Hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken up except one at Germania Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick’s right had been sent to enforce our left.  This left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from all present base of supplies.  Sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against attack.  But late in the afternoon of the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon Sedgwick’s right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created considerable confusion.  Early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers.  The defence, however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were.  Early says in his Memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort.  Many officers, who had not been attacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even after Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee’s army withdrew within their intrenchments.  On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy’s cavalry from Catharpin Furnace to Todd’s Tavern.  Pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy.  Some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him.  But Lee showed no disposition to come out of his Works.  There was no battle during the day, and but little firing except in Warren’s front; he being directed about noon to make a reconnoissance in force.  This drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back.  This ended the Battle of the Wilderness.