Sherman’s plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton.  Thomas was to move out to Ringgold.  It had been Sherman’s intention to cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army.  In this he was disappointed.  Two of McPherson’s veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough.  This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign.  It is hardly necessary to say they were not returned.  That department continued to absorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war.  This left McPherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed.  He was therefore brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of Thomas—­the two coming together about Dalton.  The three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time.

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable.  There was a narrowing up in the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran.  Besides, the stream had been dammed so that the valley was a lake.  Through this gorge the troops would have to pass.  McPherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.  This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided to abandon his position at Dalton.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy’s rear.  Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing.  The pursuit was continued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that Newton’s division overtook the rear of Johnston’s army and engaged it.  Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his railroad trains.  He was depending upon the railroad for all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed as Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt.  This work was pushed forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt.