In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader.  I said I wanted the very best man in the army for that command.  Halleck was present and spoke up, saying:  “How would Sheridan do?” I replied:  “The very man I want.”  The President said I could have anybody I wanted.  Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac.  This relieved General Alfred Pleasonton.  It was not a reflection on that officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile to be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left.  Each plan presented advantages. (25) If by his right—­my left—­the Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the James River.  But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in following.  A movement by his left—­our right—­would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with.  All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered.  The country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle.  In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio.  While he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison.  On the first intelligence of Forrest’s raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.  Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the Mississippi River.  The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry.  These troops fought bravely, but were overpowered.  I will leave Forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them.

“The river was dyed,” he says, “with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards.  The approximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping.  My loss was about twenty killed.  It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners.”  Subsequently Forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read.