I therefore determined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction and then turn upon Pemberton.  But by moving against Jackson, I uncovered my own communication.  So I finally decided to have none—­to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward.  I then had no fears for my communications, and if I moved quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in the rear.

Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones.  McPherson was ordered at daylight to move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson; Sherman was notified of my determination to capture Jackson and work from there westward.  He was ordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond.  McClernand was ordered to march with three divisions by Dillon’s to Raymond.  One was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black.

On the 10th I had received a letter from Banks, on the Red River, asking reinforcements.  Porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his fleet on the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position and declining to send any troops.  I looked upon side movements as long as the enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg as a waste of time and material.

General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13th from Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the Confederate troops in Mississippi.  I knew he was expecting reinforcements from the south and east.  On the 6th I had written to General Halleck:  “Information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are bringing forces from Tullahoma.”

Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each other, as far as the nature of the country would admit.  Reconnoissances were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case a union became necessary.

McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th and immediately set to work destroying the railroad.  Sherman’s advance reached Raymond before the last of McPherson’s command had got out of the town.  McClernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at Edward’s station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for the night in good order.  On the night of the 13th, McPherson was ordered to march at early dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away.  Sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road from Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city.  McClernand was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton, one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs following Sherman’s line, and a third to Raymond.  He was also directed to send his siege guns, four in number with the troops