During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north of the Big Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson, via Rocky Springs, Utica and Raymond.  That night he and McClernand were both at Rocky Springs ten miles from Hankinson’s ferry.  McPherson remained there during the 8th, while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Sherman marched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson’s ferry.  The 9th, McPherson moved to a point within a few miles west of Utica; McClernand and Sherman remained where they were.  On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica, Sherman to Big Sandy; McClernand was still at Big Sandy.  The 11th, McClernand was at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn; McPherson five miles advanced from Utica.  May 12th, McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman at Fourteen Mile Creek; McPherson at Raymond after a battle.

After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson’s ferry Vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south side.  It is not probable, however, that Pemberton would have permitted a close besiegement.  The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the Big Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point.  It was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, and approach from that direction.  Accordingly, McPherson’s troops that had crossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jackson commenced.

As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills.  The troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it.  McClernand’s corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the crossings.  Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by McClernand and Sherman with slight loss.  McPherson was to the right of Sherman, extending to Raymond.  The cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitring to find the roads:  to cover our advances and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another so they could support each other in case of an attack.  In making this move I estimated Pemberton’s movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at Haines’ Bluff and Jackson.  It would not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail.  This was done with success, but I found afterwards that I had entirely under-estimated Pemberton’s strength.