A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rosecrans arrived with the head of his column at garnets, the point where the Jacinto road to Iuka leaves the road going east.  He here turned north without sending any troops to the Fulton road.  While still moving in column up the Jacinto road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and driven back upon the main road.  In this short engagement his loss was considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him.  The wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit sounds towards either Ord or me.  Neither he nor I nor any one in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field.  After the engagement Rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result.  This was brought by a courier.  There was no road between Burnsville and the position then occupied by Rosecrans and the country was impassable for a man on horseback.  The courier bearing the message was compelled to move west nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to Burnsville.  This made it a late hour of the night before I learned of the battle that had taken place during the afternoon.  I at once notified Ord of the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning.  The next morning Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with but little resistance.  Ord also went in according to orders, without hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming from the south-west must be up by that time.  Rosecrans, however, had put no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by that road during the night.  Word was soon brought to me that our troops were in Iuka.  I immediately rode into town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry.  I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans’ command and went on with him a few miles in person.  He followed only a few miles after I left him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further.  I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka—­but I had so high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Van Dorn’s movements—­battle of Corinth—­command of the department of the Tennessee.

On the 19th of September General Geo. H. Thomas was ordered east to reinforce Buell.  This threw the army at my command still more on the defensive.  The Memphis and Charleston railroad was abandoned, except at Corinth, and small forces were left at Chewalla and Grand Junction.  Soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and Bolivar became our most advanced position on the Mississippi Central railroad.  Our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were sent out to watch the movements of the enemy.  We were in a country where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us and friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress.  It was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move.  We, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then often returned without it.