Corinth, Mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from Pittsburg landing and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, but probably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road.  It is about four miles south of the line dividing the States of Tennessee and Mississippi, and at the junction of the Mississippi and Chattanooga railroad with the Mobile and Ohio road which runs from Columbus to Mobile.  From Pittsburg to Corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevation that makes high hills to pass over.  In 1862 the greater part of the country was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses.  Underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines, but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passing through with ease.  There are two small creeks running from north of the town and connecting some four miles south, where they form Bridge Creek which empties into the Tuscumbia River.  Corinth is on the ridge between these streams and is a naturally strong defensive position.  The creeks are insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widens out in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of an enemy.  On the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy was strongly intrenched.

Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of.  We ought to have seized it immediately after the fall of Donelson and Nashville, when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it should have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops at Pittsburg landing after the battle of Shiloh.  In fact the arrival of Pope should not have been awaited.  There was no time from the battle of Shiloh up to the evacuation of Corinth when the enemy would not have left if pushed.  The demoralization among the Confederates from their defeats at Henry and Donelson; their long marches from Bowling Green, Columbus, and Nashville, and their failure at Shiloh; in fact from having been driven out of Kentucky and Tennessee, was so great that a stand for the time would have been impossible.  Beauregard made strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded.  He appealed to the people of the South-west for new regiments, and received a few.  A. S. Johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same quarter, before the battle of Shiloh, but in a different way.  He had negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the ranks.  The people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were not willing to part with their negroes.  It is only fair to state that they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for the families left at home.