Warren did not seem to me to be at all solicitous; his manner exhibited decided apathy, and he remarked with indifference that “Bobby Lee was always getting people into trouble.”  With unconcern such as this, it is no wonder that fully three hours’ time was consumed in marching his corps from J.[G] Boisseau’s to Gravelly Run Church, though the distance was but two miles.  However, when my patience was almost worn out, Warren reported his troops ready, Ayres’s division being formed on the west side of the Gravelly Church road, Crawford’s on the east side, and Griffin in reserve behind the right of Crawford, a little different from my instructions.  The corps had no artillery present, its batteries, on account of the mud, being still north of Gravelly Run.  Meanwhile Merritt had been busy working his men close up to the intrenchments from the angle of the return west, along the White Oak road.

About 4 o’clock Warren began the attack.  He was to assault the left flank of the Confederate infantry at a point where I knew Pickett’s intrenchments were refused, almost at right angles with the White Oak road.  I did not know exactly how far toward Hatcher’s Run this part of the works extended, for here the videttes of Mumford’s cavalry were covering, but I did know where the refusal began.  This return, then, was the point I wished to assail, believing that if the assault was made with spirit, the line could be turned.  I therefore intended that Ayres and Crawford should attack the refused trenches squarely, and when these two divisions and Merritt’s cavalry became hotly engaged, Griffin’s division was to pass around the left of the Confederate line; and I personally instructed Griffin how I wished him to go in, telling him also that as he advanced, his right flank would be taken care of by Mackenzie, who was to be pushed over toward the Ford road and Hatcher’s Run.

The front of the corps was oblique to the White Oak road; and on getting there, it was to swing round to the left till perpendicular to the road, keeping closed to the left.  Ayres did his part well, and to the letter, bringing his division square up to the front of the return near the angle; but Crawford did not wheel to the left, as was intended.  On the contrary, on receiving fire from Mumford’s cavalry, Crawford swerved to the right and moved north from the return, thus isolating his division from Ayres; and Griffin, uncertain of the enemy’s position, naturally followed Crawford.

The deflection of this division on a line of march which finally brought it out on the Ford road near C. Young’s house, frustrated the purpose I had in mind when ordering the attack, and caused a gap between Ayres and Crawford, of which the enemy quickly took advantage, and succeeded in throwing a part of Ayres’s division into confusion.  At this juncture I sent word to General Warren to have Crawford recalled; for the direction he was following was not only a mistaken one, but, in case the assault at the