The battle of Fisher’s Hill was, in a measure, a part of the battle of the Opequon; that is to say, it was an incident of the pursuit resulting from that action.  In many ways, however, it was much more satisfactory, and particularly so because the plan arranged on the evening of the 20th was carried out to the very letter by Generals Wright, Crook, and Emory, not only in all their preliminary manoeuvres, but also during the fight itself.  The only drawback was with the cavalry, and to this day I have been unable to account satisfactorily for Torbert’s failure.  No doubt, Wickham’s position near Milford was a strong one, but Torbert ought to have made a fight.  Had he been defeated in this, his withdrawal then to await the result at Fisher’s Hill would have been justified, but it does not appear that he made any serious effort of all to dislodge the Confederate cavalry:  his impotent attempt not only chagrined me very much, but occasioned much unfavorable comment throughout the army.

We reached Woodstock early on the morning of the 23d, and halted there some little time to let the troops recover their organization, which had been broken in the night march they had just made.  When the commands had closed up we pushed on toward Edinburg, in the hope of making more captures at Narrow Passage Creek; but the Confederates, too fleet for us, got away; so General Wright halted the infantry not far from Edinburg, till rations could be brought the men.  Meanwhile I, having remained at Woodstock, sent Dedin’s brigade to press the enemy under every favorable opportunity, and if possible prevent him from halting long enough to reorganize.  Notwithstanding Devin’s efforts the Confederates managed to assemble a considerable force to resist him, and being too weak for the rearguard, he awaited the arrival of Averell, who, I had informed him, would be hurried to the front with all possible despatch, for I thought that Averell must be close at hand.  It turned out, however, that he was not near by at all, and, moreover, that without good reason he had refrained from taking any part whatever in pursuing the enemy in the flight from Fisher’s Hill; and in fact had gone into camp and left to the infantry the work of pursuit.

It was nearly noon when Averell came up, and a great deal of precious time had been lost.  We had some hot words, but hoping that he would retrieve the mistake of the night before, I directed him to proceed to the front at once, and in conjunction with Devin close with the enemy.  He reached Devin’s command about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, just as this officer was pushing the Confederates so energetically that they were abandoning Mount Jackson, yet Averell utterly failed to accomplish anything.  Indeed, his indifferent attack was not at all worthy the excellent soldiers he commanded, and when I learned that it was his intention to withdraw from the enemy’s front, and this, too, on the indefinite report of a signal-officer that a “brigade or division” of Confederates was turning his right flank, and that he had not seriously attempted to verify the information, I sent him this order: