In the expedition to Deep Bottom I was under the command of Major-General Hancock, who, by seniority, was to control my corps as well as his own until the way was opened for me to get out on the Virginia Central railroad.  If this opportunity was gained, I was to cut loose and damage Lee’s communications with the Shenandoah Valley in such manner as best suited the conditions, but my return was not to be jeopardized nor long delayed.  This necessitated that Hancock’s line should extend to Bottom’s bridge on the Chickahominy.  The enemy’s early discovery of the movement and his concentration of troops on the north side prevented Hancock from accomplishing the programme laid out for him.  Its impracticability was demonstrated early on the 27th, and Hancock’s soldierly instincts told him this the moment he unexpectedly discovered Kershaw blocking the New Market and Charles City roads.  To Hancock the temptation to assault Kershaw’s position was strong indeed, but if he carried it there would still remain the dubious problem of holding the line necessary for my safe return, so with rare judgment he desisted zealously turning to the alternative proposition—­the assault on Petersburg—­for more significant results.  This was the only occasion during the war in which I was associated with Hancock in campaign.  Up till then we had seldom met, and that was the first opportunity I had to observe his quick apprehension, his physical courage, and the soldierly personality which had long before established his high reputation.

On the 1st of August, two days after the mine explosion, I was. relieved from the personal command of the Cavalry Corps, and ordered to the Shenandoah Valley, where at a later date Torbert’s and Wilson’s divisions joined me.  Practically, after I went to the valley, my command of the Cavalry Corps became supervisory merely.  During the period of my immediate control of the corps, I tried to carry into effect, as far as possible, the views I had advanced before and during the opening of the Wilderness campaign, i.e., “that our cavalry ought to fight the enemy’s cavalry, and our infantry the enemy’s infantry”; for there was great danger of breaking the spirit of the corps if it was to be pitted against the enemy’s compact masses of foot-troops posted behind intrenchments, and unless there was some adequate tactical or strategical advantage to be gained, such a use of it would not be justified.  Immediately succeeding the battles of the Wilderness, opportunity offered to put this plan into execution to some extent, and from that time forward—­from the battle of Yellow Tavern—­our success was almost continuous, resulting finally, before the close of the war, in the nearly total annihilation of the enemy’s cavalry.