We did not go far before we found the enemy’s infantry posted across these two roads behind a strong line of intrenchments on the west bank of Bailey’s Creek.  His videttes in front of Ruffin’s house on the New Market road were soon driven in on their main line, and the high ground before the house was immediately occupied by Torbert and Gregg, supported by Kautz’s division.  By the time the cavalry line was formed the Confederate General Kershaw, with his own division of infantry and those of Wilcox and Heath, advanced to attack us.  Directing the most of his troops against the cavalry, which was still mounted, Kershaw drove it back some distance over the high ground.  When it reached the eastern face of the ridge, however, it was quickly dismounted, and the men directed to lie down in line of battle about fifteen yards from the crest, and here the onset of the enemy was awaited.  When Kershaw’s men reached the crest such a severe fire was opened on them, and at such close quarters, that they could not withstand it, and gave way in disorder.  They were followed across the plain by the cavalry, and lost about two hundred and fifty prisoners and two battle-flags.  The counter attack against the infantry by Torbert and Gregg re-established our line and gave us the victory of Darbytown, but it also demonstrated the fact that General Lee had anticipated the movement around his left flank by transferring to the north side of the James a large portion of his infantry and W. H. F. Lee’s division of cavalry.

This development rendered useless any further effort on Hancock’s part or mine to carry out the plan of the expedition, for General Grant did not intend Hancock to assault the enemy’s works unless there should be found in them but a very thin line of infantry which could be surprised.  In such event, Hancock was to operate so that the cavalry might turn the Confederates on the Central or Charles City road, but the continually increasing force of the enemy showed this to be impracticable.  The long front presented by Hancock’s corps and the cavalry deceived General Lee, and he undoubtedly thought that nearly all of Grant’s army had been moved to the north side of the James River; and to meet the danger he transferred the most of his own strength to the same side to confront his adversary, thinning the lines around Petersburg to reinforce those opposing us on the Central and New Market roads.  This was what Grant hoped Lee would do in case the operations of Hancock and myself became impracticable, for Grant had an alternative plan for carrying Petersburg by assault in conjunction with the explosion of a mine that had been driven under the enemy’s works from the front of Burnside’s corps.