Had Gregg and Merritt been permitted to proceed as they were originally instructed, it is doubtful whether the battles fought at Spottsylvania would have occurred, for these two divisions would have encountered the enemy at the Pa River, and so delayed his march as to enable our infantry to reach Spottsylvania first, and thus force Lee to take up a line behind the Po.  I had directed Wilson to move from the left by “the Gate” through Spottsylvania to Snell’s bridge, while Gregg and Merritt were to advance to the same point by Shady Grove and the Block House.  There was nothing to prevent at least a partial success of these operations; that is to say, the concentration of the three divisions in front of Snell’s bridge, even if we could not actually have gained it.  But both that important point and the bridge on the Block House road were utterly ignored, and Lee’s approach to Spottsylvania left entirely unobstructed, while three divisions of cavalry remained practically ineffective by reason of disjointed and irregular instructions.

On the morning of the 8th, when I found that such orders had been given, I made some strong remonstrances against the course that had been pursued, but it was then too late to carry out the combinations I had projected the night before, so I proceeded to join Merritt on the Spottsylvania road.  On reaching Merritt I found General Warren making complaint that the cavalry were obstructing his infantry column, so I drew Merritt off the road, and the leading division of the Fifth Corps pushed up to the front.  It got into line about 11 o’clock, and advanced to take the village, but it did not go very far before it struck Anderson’s corps, and was hurled back with heavy loss.  This ended all endeavor to take Spottsylvania that day.

A little before noon General Meade sent for me, and when I reached his headquarters I found that his peppery temper had got the better of his good judgment, he showing a disposition to be unjust, laying blame here and there for the blunders that had been committed.  He was particularly severe on the cavalry, saying, among other things, that it had impeded the march of the Fifth Corps by occupying the Spottsylvania road.  I replied that if this were true, he himself had ordered it there without my knowledge.  I also told him that he had broken up my combinations, exposed Wilson’s division to disaster, and kept Gregg unnecessarily idle, and further, repelled his insinuations by saying that such disjointed operations as he had been requiring of the cavalry for the last four days would render the corps inefficient and useless before long.  Meade was very much irritated, and I was none the less so.  One word brought on another, until, finally, I told him that I could whip Stuart if he (Meade) would only let me, but since he insisted on giving the cavalry directions without consulting or even notifying me, he could henceforth command the Cavalry Corps himself—­that I would not give it another order.