At this stage, and in fact prior to it, Rosecrans seemed to manifest special confidence in me, often discussing his plans with me independent of the occasions on which he formally referred them for my views.  I recollect that on two different occasions about this time he unfolded his designs to me in this informal way, outlining generally how he expected ultimately to force Bragg south of the Tennessee River, and going into the details of the contemplated move on Tullahoma.  His schemes, to my mind, were not only comprehensive, but exact, and showed conclusively, what no one doubted then, that they were original with him.  I found in them very little to criticise unfavorably, if we were to move at all, and Rosecrans certainly impressed me that he favored an advance at an early day, though many of his generals were against it until the operations on the Mississippi River should culminate in something definite.  There was much, fully apparent in the circumstances about his headquarters, leading to the conviction that Rosecrans originated the Tullahoma campaign, and the record of his prior performances collaterally sustains the visible evidence then existing.  In my opinion, then, based on a clear recollection of various occurrences growing out of our intimacy, he conceived the plan of the Tullahoma campaign and the one succeeding it; and is therefore entitled to every credit that attended their execution, no matter what may be claimed for others.

On the 23d of June Bragg was covering his position north of Duck River with a front extending from McMinnville, where his cavalry rested, through Wartrace and Shelbyville to Columbia, his depot being at Tullahoma.  Rosecrans, thinking that Bragg would offer strong resistance at Shelbyville—­which was somewhat protected by a spur of low mountains or hills, offshoots of the Cumberland Mountains —­decided to turn that place; consequently, he directed the mass of the Union army on the enemy’s right flank, about Manchester.

On the 26th of June McCook’s corps advanced toward Liberty Gap, my divisions marching on the Shelbyville pike.  I had proceeded but a few miles when I encountered the enemy’s pickets, who fell back to Christiana, about nine miles from Murfreesboro’.  Here I was assailed pretty wickedly by the enemy’s sharpshooters and a section of artillery, but as I was instructed to do nothing more than cover the road from Eagleville, over which Brannan’s division was to approach Christiana, I made little reply to this severe annoyance, wishing to conceal the strength of my force.  As soon as the head of Brannan’s column arrived I marched across-country to the left, and encamped that night at the little town of Millersburg, in the vicinity of Liberty Gap.  I was directed to move from Millersburg, on Hoover’s Gap—­a pass in the range of hills already referred to, through which ran the turnpike from Murfreesboro’ to Manchester—­but heavy rains had made the country roads almost impassable, and the last of my