came, and reported him as on the way.  It must have been nearly 2 p.m. when he arrived, as before, with General Wade Hampton.  He had halted his escort out of sight, and we again entered Bennett’s house, and I closed the door.  General Johnston then assured me that he had authority over all the Confederate armies, so that they would obey his orders to surrender on the same terms with his own, but he argued that, to obtain so cheaply this desirable result, I ought to give his men and officers some assurance of their political rights after their surrender.  I explained to him that Mr. Lincoln’s proclamation of amnesty, of December 8, 1863, still in force; enabled every Confederate soldier and officer, below the rank of colonel, to obtain an absolute pardon, by simply laying down his arms, and taking the common oath of allegiance, and that General Grant, in accepting the surrender of General Lee’s army, had extended the same principle to all the officers, General Lee included; such a pardon, I understood, would restore to them all their rights of citizenship.  But he insisted that the officers and men of the Confederate army were unnecessarily alarmed about this matter, as a sort of bugbear.  He then said that Mr. Breckenridge was near at hand, and he thought that it would be well for him to be present.  I objected, on the score that he was then in Davis’s cabinet, and our negotiations should be confined strictly to belligerents.  He then said Breckenridge was a major-general in the Confederate army, and might sink his character of Secretary of War.  I consented, and he sent one of his staff-officers back, who soon returned with Breckenridge, and he entered the room.  General Johnston and I then again went over the whole ground, and Breckenridge confirmed what he had said as to the uneasiness of the Southern officers and soldiers about their political rights in case of surrender.  While we were in consultation, a messenger came with a parcel of papers, which General Johnston said were from Mr. Reagan, Postmaster-General.  He and Breckenridge looked over them, and, after some side conversation, he handed one of the papers to me.  It was in Reagan’s handwriting, and began with a long preamble and terms, so general and verbose, that I said they were inadmissible.  Then recalling the conversation of Mr. Lincoln, at City Point, I sat down at the table, and wrote off the terms, which I thought concisely expressed his views and wishes, and explained that I was willing to submit these terms to the new President, Mr. Johnson, provided that both armies should remain in statu quo until the truce therein declared should expire.  I had full faith that General Johnston would religiously respect the truce, which he did; and that I would be the gainer, for in the few days it would take to send the papers to Washington, and receive an answer, I could finish the railroad up to Raleigh, and be the better prepared for a long chase.

Neither Mr. Breckenridge nor General Johnston wrote one word of that paper.  I wrote it myself, and announced it as the best I could do, and they readily assented.