The people of South Carolina, instead of feeding Lee’s army, will now call on Lee to feed them.

I want you to send me all the shoes, stockings, drawers, sugar, coffee, and flour, you can spare; finish the loads with oats or corn:  Have the boats escorted, and let them run at night at any risk.  We must not give time for Jos.  Johnston to concentrate at Goldsboro’.  We cannot prevent his concentrating at Raleigh, but he shall have no rest.  I want General Schofield to go on with his railroad from Newbern as far as he can, and you should do the same from Wilmington.  If we can get the roads to and secure Goldsboro’ by April 10th, it will be soon enough; but every day now is worth a million of dollars.  I can whip Jos.  Johnston provided he does not catch one of my corps in flank, and I will see that the army marches hence to Goldsboro’ in compact form.

I must rid our army of from twenty to thirty thousand useless mouths; as many to go down Cape Fear as possible, and the rest to go in vehicles or on captured horses via Clinton to Wilmington.

I thank you for the energetic action that has marked your course, and shall be most happy to meet you.  I am, truly your friend,

W. T. Sherman, Major-General.

In quick succession I received other messages from General Terry, of older date, and therefore superseded by that brought by the tug Davidson, viz., by two naval officers, who had come up partly by canoes and partly by land; General Terry had also sent the Thirteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry to search for us, under Colonel Kerwin, who had dispatched Major Berks with fifty men, who reached us at Fayetteville; so that, by March 12th, I was in full communication with General Terry and the outside world.  Still, I was anxious to reach Goldsboro’, there to make junction with General Schofield, so as to be ready for the next and last stage of the war.  I then knew that my special antagonist, General Jos.  E. Johnston, was back, with part of his old army; that he would not be misled by feints and false reports, and would somehow compel me to exercise more caution than I had hitherto done.  I then over-estimated his force at thirty-seven thousand infantry, supposed to be made up of S. D. Lee’s corps, four thousand; Cheatham’s, five thousand; Hoke’s, eight thousand; Hardee’s, ten thousand; and other detachments, ten thousand; with Hampton’s, Wheeler’s, and Butler’s cavalry, about eight thousand.  Of these, only Hardee and the cavalry were immediately in our front, while the bulk of Johnston’s army was supposed to be collecting at or near Raleigh.  I was determined, however, to give him as little time for organization as possible, and accordingly crossed Cape Fear River, with all the army, during the 13th and 14th, leaving one division as a rearguard, until the arsenal could be completely destroyed.  This was deliberately and completely leveled on the 14th, when fire was applied to the wreck.  Little other damage was done at Fayetteville.