to be laid across the Oostenaula River at Lay’s Ferry, about three miles below the town, by which we could threaten Calhoun, a station on the railroad seven miles below Resaca.  At the same time, May 14th, I dispatched General Garrard, with his cavalry division, down the Oostenaula by the Rome road, with orders to cross over, if possible, and to attack or threaten the railroad at any point below Calhoun and above Kingston.

During the 15th, without attempting to assault the fortified works, we pressed at all points, and the sound of cannon and musketry rose all day to the dignity of a battle.  Toward evening McPherson moved his whole line of battle forward, till he had gained a ridge overlooking the town, from which his field-artillery could reach the railroad-bridge across the Oostenaula.  The enemy made several attempts to drive him away, repeating the sallies several times, and extending them into the night; but in every instance he was repulsed with bloody loss.

Hooker’s corps had also some heavy and handsome fighting that afternoon and night on the left, where the Dalton roan entered the intrenchments, capturing a four-gun intrenched battery, with its men and guns; and generally all our men showed the finest fighting qualities.

Howard’s corps had followed Johnston down from Dalton, and was in line; Stoneman’s division of cavalry had also got up, and was on the extreme left, beyond the Oostenaula.

On the night of May 15th Johnston got his army across the bridges, set them on fire, and we entered Resaca at daylight.  Our loss up to that time was about six hundred dead and thirty-three hundred and seventy-five wounded—­mostly light wounds that did not necessitate sending the men to the rear for treatment.  That Johnston had deliberately designed in advance to give up such strong positions as Dalton and Resaca, for the purpose of drawing us farther south, is simply absurd.  Had he remained in Dalton another hour, it would have been his total defeat, and he only evacuated Resaca because his safety demanded it.  The movement by us through Snake-Creek Gap was a total surprise to him.  My army about doubled his in size, but he had all the advantages of natural positions, of artificial forts and roads, and of concentrated action.  We were compelled to grope our way through forests, across mountains, with a large army, necessarily more or less dispersed.  Of course, I was disappointed not to have crippled his, army more at that particular stage of the game; but, as it resulted, these rapid successes gave us the initiative, and the usual impulse of a conquering army.

Johnston having retreated in the night of May 15th, immediate pursuit was begun.  A division of infantry (Jeff.  C. Davis’s) was at once dispatched down the valley toward Rome, to support Garrard’s cavalry, and the whole army was ordered to pursue, McPherson by Lay’s Ferry, on the right, Thomas directly by the railroad, and Schofield by the left, by the old road that crossed the Oostenaula above Echota or Newtown.