Of course, this judgment; made after the event, was extremely flattering and was all I ever expected, a recognition of the truth and of its importance.  I have often been asked, by well-meaning friends, when the thought of that march first entered my mind.  I knew that an army which had penetrated Georgia as far as Atlanta could not turn back.  It must go ahead, but when, how, and where, depended on many considerations.  As soon as Hood had shifted across from Lovejoy’s to Palmetto, I saw the move in my “mind’s eye;” and, after Jeff.  Davis’s speech at Palmetto, of September 26th, I was more positive in my conviction, but was in doubt as to the time and manner.  When General Hood first struck our railroad above Marietta, we were not ready, and I was forced to watch his movements further, till he had “carromed” off to the west of Decatur.  Then I was perfectly convinced, and had no longer a shadow of doubt.  The only possible question was as to Thomas’s strength and ability to meet Hood in the open field.  I did not suppose that General Hood, though rash, would venture to attack fortified places like Allatoona, Resaca, Decatur, and Nashville; but he did so, and in so doing he played into our hands perfectly.

On the 2d of November I was at Kingston, Georgia, and my four corps—­the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth—­with one division of cavalry, were strung from Rome to Atlanta.  Our railroads and telegraph had been repaired, and I deliberately prepared for the march to Savannah, distant three hundred miles from Atlanta.  All the sick and wounded men had been sent back by rail to Chattanooga; all our wagon-trains had been carefully overhauled and loaded, so as to be ready to start on an hour’s notice, and there was no serious enemy in our front.

General Hood remained still at Florence, Alabama, occupying both banks of the Tennessee River, busy in collecting shoes and clothing for his men, and the necessary ammunition and stores with which to invade Tennessee, most of which had to come from Mobile, Selma, and Montgomery, Alabama, over railroads that were still broken.  Beauregard was at Corinth, hastening forward these necessary preparations.

General Thomas was at Nashville, with Wilson’s dismounted cavalry and a mass of new troops and quartermaster’s employs amply sufficient to defend the place.  The Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, under Generals Stanley and Schofield were posted at Pulaski, Tennessee, and the cavalry of Hatch, Croxton, and Capron, were about Florence, watching Hood.  Smith’s (A.  J.) two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps were still in Missouri, but were reported as ready to embark at Lexington for the Cumberland River and Nashville.  Of course, General Thomas saw that on him would likely fall the real blow, and was naturally anxious.  He still kept Granger’s division at Decatur, Rousseau’s at Murfreesboro’, and Steedman’s at Chattanooga, with strong railroad guards at all the essential points intermediate, confident that by means of this very railroad he could make his concentration sooner than Hood could possibly march up from Florence.