It was at Ship’s Gap that a courier brought me the cipher message from General Halleck which intimated that the authorities in Washington were willing I should undertake the march across Georgia to the sea.  The translated dispatch named “Horse-i-bar Sound” as the point where the fleet would await my arrival.  After much time I construed it to mean, “Ossabaw Sound,” below Savannah, which was correct.

On the 16th I telegraphed to General Thomas, at Nashville: 

Send me Morgan’s and Newton’s old divisions.  Reestablish the road, and I will follow Hood wherever he may go.  I think he will move to Blue Mountain.  We can maintain our men and animals on the country.

General Thomas’s reply was: 

Nashville, October 17, 1864—­10.30 a.m.

Major-General Sherman: 

Your dispatch from Ship’s Gap, 5 p.m. of the 16th, just received.  Schofield, whom I placed in command of the two divisions (Wagner’s and Morgan’s), was to move up Lookout Valley this A.M., to intercept Hood, should he be marching for Bridgeport.  I will order him to join you with the two divisions, and will reconstruct the road as soon as possible.  Will also reorganize the guards for posts and block-houses ....  Mower and Wilson have arrived, and are on their way to join you.  I hope you will adopt Grant’s idea of turning Wilson loose, rather than undertake the plan of a march with the whole force through Georgia to the sea, inasmuch as General Grant cannot cooperate with you as at first arranged.

George H. Thomas, Major-General.

So it is clear that at that date neither General Grant nor General Thomas heartily favored my proposed plan of campaign.  On the same day, I wrote to General Schofield at Chattanooga: 

Hood is not at Dear Head Cove.  We occupy Ship’s Gap and Lafayette.  Hood is moving south via Summerville, Alpine, and Gadsden.  If he enters Tennessee, it will be to the west of Huntsville, but I think he has given up all such idea.  I want the road repaired to Atlanta; the sick and wounded men sent north of the Tennessee; my army recomposed; and I will then make the interior of Georgia feel the weight of war.  It is folly for us to be moving our armies on the reports of scouts and citizens.  We must maintain the offensive.  Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head was right —­the move to defend Caperton’s Ferry is wrong.  Notify General Thomas of these my views.  We must follow Hood till he is beyond the reach of mischief, and then resume the offensive.

The correspondence between me and the authorities at Washington, as well as with the several army commanders, given at length in the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, is full on all these points.