He then judged it not unprofitable to call public attention to the fallacies which first found their way into practical politics through the disciples of Rousseau; one of those speculators of whom he remarks ("Collected Essays” 1 312) that] “busied with deduction from their ideal ‘ought to be,’ they overlooked the ‘what has been,’ the ’what is,’ and the ‘what can be.’” “Many a long year ago,” [he says in Natural Rights and Political Rights (1 336)], “I fondly imagined that Hume and Kant and Hamilton having slain the ‘Absolute,’ the thing must, in decency, decease. Yet, at the present time, the same hypostatised negation, sometimes thinly disguised under a new name, goes about in broad daylight, in company with the dogmas of absolute ethics, political and other, and seems to be as lively as ever.” This was to his mind one of those instances of wrong thinking which lead to wrong acting—the postulating a general principle based upon insufficient data, and the deduction from it of many and far-reaching practical consequences. This he had always strongly opposed. His essay of 1871, “Administrative Nihilism,” was directed against a priori individualism; and now he proceeded to restate the arguments against a priori political reasoning in general, which seemed to have been forgotten or overlooked, especially by the advocates of compulsory socialism. And here it is possible to show in some detail the care he took, as was his way, to refresh his knowledge and bring it up to date, before writing on any special point. It is interesting to see how thoroughly he went to work, even in a subject with which he was already fairly acquainted. As in the controversy of 1889 I find a list of near a score of books consulted, so here one note-book contains an analysis of the origin and early course of the French Revolution, especially in relation to the speculations of the theorists; the declaration of the rights of man in 1789 is followed by parallels from Mably’s “Droits et Devoirs du Citoyen” and “De la Legislation”, and by a full transcript of the 1793 Declaration, with notes on Robespierre’s speech at the Convention a fortnight later. There are copious notes from Dunoyer, who is quoted in the article, while the references to Rocquain’s “Esprit Revolutionnaire” led to an English translation of the work being undertaken, to which he contributed a short preface in 1891.
It was the same with other studies. He loved to visualise his object clearly. The framework of what he wished to say would always be drawn out first. In any historical matter he always worked with a map. In natural history he well knew the importance of studying distribution and its bearing upon other problems; in civil history he would draw maps to illustrate either the conditions of a period or the spread of a civilising nation. For instance, among sketches of the sort which remain, I have one of the Hellenic world, marked off in 25-mile circles from Delos as centre; and a similar one for the Phoenician world, starting from Tyre. Sketch maps of Palestine and Mesopotamia, with notes from the best authorities on the geography of the two countries, belong in all probability to the articles on “The Flood” and “Hasisadra’s Adventure.” To realise clearly the size, position, and relation of the parts to the whole, was the mechanical instinct of the engineer which was so strong in him.