But he does not content himself with pointing out the destructive effects of criticism upon the evidence in favour of a “supernature”—­“The present incarnation of the spirit of the Renascence,” he writes, “differs from its predecessor in the eighteenth century, in that it builds up, as well as pulls down.  That of which it has laid the foundation, of which it is already raising the superstructure, is the doctrine of evolution,” a doctrine that “is no speculation, but a generalisation of certain facts, which may be observed by any one who will take the necessary trouble.”  And in a short dozen pages he sketches out that “common body of established truths” to which it is his confident belief that “all future philosophical and theological speculations will have to accommodate themselves.”

There is no need to recapitulate these; they may be read in “Science and Christian Tradition”, the fifth volume of the “Collected Essays”; but it is worth noticing that in conclusion, after rejecting “a great many supernaturalistic theories and legends which have no better foundations than those of heathenism,” he declares himself as far from wishing to “throw the Bible aside as so much waste paper” as he was at the establishment of the School Board in 1870.  As English literature, as world-old history, as moral teaching, as the Magna Charta of the poor and of the oppressed, the most democratic book in the world, he could not spare it.] “I do not say,” [he adds], “that even the highest biblical ideal is exclusive of others or needs no supplement.  But I do believe that the human race is not yet, possibly may never be, in a position to dispense with it.”

[It was this volume that led to the writing of the magazine article referred to above.  The republication in it of the “Agnosticism,” originally written in reply to an article of Mr. Frederic Harrison’s, induced the latter to disclaim in the “Fortnightly Review” the intimate connection assumed to exist between his views and the system of Positivism detailed by Comte, and at the same time to offer the olive branch to his former opponent.  But while gratefully accepting the goodwill implied in the offer, Huxley still declared himself unable to] “give his assent to a single doctrine which is the peculiar property of Positivism, old or new,” [nor to agree with Mr. Harrison when he wanted:—­]

to persuade us that agnosticism is only the Court of the Gentiles of the Positivist temple; and that those who profess ignorance about the proper solution of certain speculative problems ought to call themselves Positivists of the Gate, if it happens that they also take a lively interest in social and political questions.

[This essay, “An Apologetic Irenicon,” contains more than one passage of personal interest, which are the more worth quoting here, as the essay has not been republished.  It was to have been included in a tenth volume of collected Essays, along with a number of others which he projected, but never wrote.