A later and English expression of the feeling that morality needs no justification may be found in Bradley’s ethical studies. [Footnote:  Pages 56-57.] “To take virtue as a mere means to an ulterior end is in direct antagonism to the voice of moral consciousness.  That consciousness, when unwarped by selfishness and not blinded by sophistry, is convinced that to ask for the Why is simple immorality; to do good for its own sake is virtue, to do it for some ulterior end or object...is never virtue...Virtue not only does seem to be, but is, an end in itself.  Against the base mechanical which meets us on all sides, with its ‘What is the use’ of goodness, or beauty, or truth, there is but one fitting answer from the friends of science, or art, or religion and virtue, ‘We do not know and we do not care.’”

(1) But morality would then be a mere arbitrary tyranny; if it were of no use, the sacrifices it demands would be sheer cruelty.  A moral law irrelevant to human interests would have no possible authority over us; it would not be a moral, i.e,. a right, law for us.

(2) And what criterion should we have to judge what is virtuous?  “Virtue for virtue’s sake” is equivalent to “the best way because it is the best way.”  But what makes it the best way?  And how shall we decide what is the best way?

(3) We must be blind not to see the use of morality, even if we feel that usefulness degrades it.  All moralists agree that virtue does actually lead to happiness.  But is that connection a mere accident?  Is it not likely that the usefulness of virtue has something to do with its origin and existence?

(4) A real practical value of the motto “Virtue for virtue’s sake” lies in the implied rejection of virtue for individual profit merely.  The moralist rightly feels that such proverbs as “Honesty is the best policy,” “Ill-gotten gains do not prosper,” do not strike deep enough.  Even if ill-gotten gain should prosper, it would be wrong.  But it would be wrong simply because of the damage to others’ welfare, not for any transcendental reason.  The opponent of the eudaemonistic account of morality nearly always identifies it with a selfish pursuit, by each individual, of his own personal happiness.  But that is, of course, a very narrow and unjustifiable interpretation of it.

(5) Another practical value of the motto lies in the implied contrast of virtue with expediency.  Questions of expediency are questions of the best means to a given end; questions of virtue ask which ends are to be sought.  Expediency asks, “How shall I do this?” Virtue asks, “Shall I do this or that?” The counsels of expediency are thus always relative to the value of the end, in itself unquestioned; “this is the thing to do if such and such an end is right to seek.”  The counsels of virtue are absolute-"This is the best thing to do.”  It is rightly felt that in matters of right and wrong there is no “if” about it; you act not with relation to an end which may be chosen or rejected, on ulterior grounds.  The only end to which virtue is the means is-the living of the best life.  Virtue is the ultimate expediency.  But it is well contrasted with all those secondary matters of debate for which we reserve the name “expediency.”