For criticisms of the account of morality here defended:  F. Paulsen, System of Ethics, book ii, chap.  II.  J. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, book ii, chaps, I, ii.  T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, book in, chap.  I, first half, book iv, chap.  III.  Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap.  XIV.  J. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, 2d ed, chap. vi.  H. Rashdall, Theory of Good and Evil, book I, chap, iii; book ii, chaps, I, ii.  W. Fite, Introductory Study of Ethics, part I. G. E. Moore, Ethics, chap.  VII.  In rebuttal of some of these arguments:  J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, chaps, ii and iv.  H. Spencer, Data of Ethics, chaps, ix, X. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, chap.  X.

CHAPTER XIII

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

After this summary answer to the commoner objections to our account of morality, we should notice a few of the more persistently recurrent formulas that seem inconsistent with this explanation of its fundamental nature.

Is morality “categorical,” beyond need of justification?

To Kant and his followers, as well as to many less philosophical minds, the justification of morality by its utility has seemed unworthy.  Morality is much more ultimate and imperious.  The pursuit of happiness is not binding; morality is.  The way to attain happiness is dubious and variable; the commandments of morality are clear-cut and certain.  Different people find happiness in different activities; the laws of morality are universal and changeless.  Morality, therefore, is prior to the pursuit of happiness; its dictates are known by an independent faculty.  There is in us all an unanalyzable and unavoidable “ought”; ours not to reason why; ours but to do-and die, if need be.  Morality is not a means to employ if we wish happiness; in that case its precepts would be but hypothetical, if you wish happiness, do so and so.  No, its commands are categorical.  The inescapable fact of “oughtness” is the bottom fact upon which our ethics must be built.  To the truth in this manner of speech we must all respond.  As we have seen, morality is not purely subjective and relative; it carries the authority not of opinion but of fact.  The right, the best way, is unconditionally best, whether we are wise enough to desire it or no.  The greatest good is the greatest good, however narrow or short- sighted our impulses.  Kant expresses eloquently the absolute and inescapable nature of duty in its perennial opposition to our transitory and nickering desires.