(1) We do not hold a man responsible at all for unforeseeable results of his action.  If because of turning his cows into pasture a passing dog gets excited and tramples a neighbor’s flower-bed, the owner of the cows is not responsible for the damage; it would do no good to exact punishment for what was so indirectly and unexpectedly due to his action.

(2) But if his cows got over the wall and trampled the beds, he would be held responsible, in different degrees, according to the circumstances.  If he had inspected the wall with eyes of experience and honestly thought it would keep the cows in, we deem him only slightly responsible.  He could have done nothing more; yet he must learn more accurately to distinguish safe walls from unsafe.  It is fairer for him to pay for the damage than for the owner of the flower- bed to suffer the loss; such risks must be assumed as a part of the business of keeping cows.

(3) If he was ignorant of the necessary height or strength of wall, we blame him more.  He has no business-keeping cows until he knows all aspects of the business.

(4) If there was a gap in the wall which he would have noticed if he had taken ordinary care, we hold him still further to blame, and his punishment must be severer.

(5) If he remembered the gap in the wall and did not take the trouble to repair it, thereby consenting to the damage his cows might do, his case is still worse.

(6) Finally, if he deliberately turned the cows into his field with the hope that they would go through the gap and damage his neighbor’s flower-beds, he is the most dangerous type of criminal, of “malice aforethought,” and his punishment must be severest of all.

In such ways do we distinguish between traits of character more and more dangerous to society, and adjust our blame and punishment to their different degrees of danger, and the differing degrees of efficacy that the blame and punishment may have.  But throughout these are purely utilitarian, an unhappy necessity for the preservation of human welfare.

On goodness of character:  Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, chap.  XII.  F. Paulsen, System of Ethics, book ii, chap, I, secs. 3, 5.  Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, chap.  VII.

The Kantian theory:  Kant’s Metaphysic of Morality.  A good edition in English is Abbott’s Kant’s Theory of Ethics.  There are many discussions of his theory.  An interesting recent one is Felix Adler’s, in Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James; see also the chapter of Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, above mentioned; Paulsen, System of Ethics, book ii, chap.  V, secs. 3, 4; American Journal of Psychology, vol. 8, p. 528.  On responsibility:  Mezes, op. cit, pp. 29-35.  Sutherland, op. cit, vol.  II, chap.  XVIII.  Alexander, Moral Order and Progress, book iii, chap, iii, sec.

CHAPTER X