As a matter of fact, however, we do praise and admire and love the saints who do right easily and graciously.  We do not refuse our admiration to Christ because it was his meat and drink, his deepest joy, to do his Father’s work; nor do we imagine him as having to wrestle with inner devils of spitefulness and ill-temper.  The type of character we rate highest is that from which all these lower impulses have been finally banished, the character that inevitably seeks the pure and the good.  And on the other hand, as we have just seen, we often blame the man who, with the noblest intentions, and at great cost to himself, does what we consider wrong.

It is thus true that our reactions of praise and blame are complicated and inconsistent.  We often praise a man and blame him at the same time; praise him for following his conscience, and blame him for having a narrow and distorted conscience to follow.  Different people in a community will praise or blame him according as they consider this or that aspect of his conduct.  What, then, is the rationale of these emotion-reactions?

Obviously, the same natural forces which have produced morality have, pari passu, produced these emotions; they are one of the great means by which men have been pushed into being moral.  We praise people, ultimately, because it is socially useful to praise them; the approbation of one’s fellows is one of the greatest possible incentives to right conduct.  We blame people that they and others may be thereby deterred from wrongdoing.  For ages these emotions have been arising in men’s hearts, veering their fellows toward moral action.  Neither blamer nor blamed has realized the purpose nature may be said to have had in view; the emotional reaction has been instinctive, like sneezing.  But if it had not been for its eminent usefulness it would never have developed and become so deep-rooted in us.  If blame did no good, if it did not tend to correct evildoing, it would be an unhappy and undesirable state of mind, to be weeded out, like malice or discouragement.  Praise might be kept for its intrinsic worth, its agreeableness, like sweet odors and pleasant colors.  But actually we need to conserve these reactions for their extrinsic value, as spurs and correctives.

The man who acts upon a calculated expectation of consequences is, indeed, to be praised, if the ends he has sought are good and his calculation correct.  Prudence, foresight, thoughtfulness are among the most important virtues.  On the other hand, the man who does right instinctively is to be most admired; for to reach that goal is the aim of much of our inner struggle.  The approbation we heap upon him, if not needed to keep him up to his best, at least is beneficial to others, who thereby may be stimulated to imitate his goodness.  Any sort of conduct that is in line with human welfare is to be praised and loved and sung, and kept before the minds of the young and plastic.