of intrinsic good and the least intrinsic evil.  What sort of conduct, then, is good?  And how shall we define virtue?  We are brought thus to the conception of an art which shall not only teach us which of two immediate, intrinsic, goods is the better, but shall consider all the near and remote consequences of acts, and direct us to that conduct which will produce most good in the end. [Footnote:  The impossibility of finding any other ultimate basis for our conception of moral “good” or “bad” is well expressed by Socrates in Plato’s Protagoras (p. 354):  “Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good, and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasure than it gives, or causes pain greater than the pleasure.  If, however, you call pleasure an evil in regard to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that standard.  But you have none to show...  And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain?  You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives pleasures greater than the pains.”  He then goes on to explain the need of morality,-to guide us, in the face of the foreshortening effects of our particular situation, to what will make for the greatest happiness in the long run (p. 356):  “Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when near, and smaller when at a distance?  Now suppose happiness to consist in doing or choosing the greater, and in not doing or avoiding the less, what would be the saving principle of human life?  Would not the act of measuring be the saving principle?”] is best which will in the long run bring into being the greatest possible amount of intrinsic goodness and the least intrinsic evil.  For goodness of conduct we commonly use the term “virtue”; and for intrinsic good the most widely accepted name-though one which is misleading to many is “happiness.”  So we may say, in sum, that virtue is that manner of life that tends to happiness.  Objection is occasionally made that happiness is too vague a term, too elusive a concept, to be set forth as the ultimate aim of conduct.  “Alas!” says Bradley, “the one question which no one can answer is, what is happiness?” But this is a palpable confusion of thought.  If we mean by the question, “Wherein is happiness to be found, by doing what can we attain it?” then the answer is, indeed, uncertain in its completeness; it is precisely to answer it that we study ethics.  Or if we mean, “What is the psychology of happiness?” the answer is as yet dubious; but it is irrelevant.  Whatever its psychological conditions and the means to attain it, we know happiness when we have it.  The puzzle is not to recognize it, but to get it.  By happiness we mean the steady presence of what we have called intrinsic goodness and the absence of intrinsic badness; it is as indefinable as any ultimate element of experience, but as well known to us as