It is the existence of felt goodness, intrinsic goodness, and its opposite, that allows us to attribute to objects another kind of goodness or badness, according as they are calculated to produce in us the former kind.  This kind of goodness and badness we may call extrinsic.  It is only by thus attributing a sort of goodness and badness to senseless objects that we can aim for and avoid the good and bad phases of conscious life.  In themselves these conscious moments are largely unnamable and inexpressible.  There are, as it is, dumb objectless ecstasies that are of transcendent sweetness; but we do not usually know how to reproduce them, and for the most part we have to overlook these goods in our ideals and aim only for those that we can associate with recognized outer stimuli.  For practical purposes we think rather in terms of outer objects than of our states of experience; nature has had need to make men but very slightly introspective.  And so it is that this derived use of our eulogistic and disparaging terms plays a larger part than its primary application.  But the essential point to note is that “goodness” and “badness” in the first instance refer to the fundamental cleavage between the affective qualities of experience, and only secondarily and by metonymy apply to objects in the physical world which affect our conscious states.  The next point to note is that our conscious experiences and activities themselves have not only their intrinsic value, as they pass, but an extrinsic value, as means toward future intrinsic values.  Each phase of experience has its own worth, while it lasts, and also has its results in determining future phases with their varying degrees of worth.  Our reveries, our debauches, our sacrifices are good or bad in their effects as well as in themselves.  Thus all experience has a double rating; acts are not only pleasant, agreeable, intrinsically desirable, but also wise, prudent, useful, virtuous, i.e., extrinsically desirable.  These extrinsic values usually bulk much larger in the end than the first transitory intrinsic value; but our natural tendency is to forget them and guide our action by immediate values.  Hence the need of a continual disparagement of the latter, and the many means men have adopted of emphasizing the importance of the former.  Yet, after all, our concern for the extrinsic value of acts has to do only with means to ends; and unless acts tend to produce intrinsic goodness somewhere they are not extrinsically good.  There is no sense in sacrificing an immediate good unless the alternative act will tend in its ultimate effects to produce a greater good, or unless the act sacrificed would have brought, after its present intrinsic good, some greater intrinsic evil.  The sacrifice of a good for no greater good is asceticism or fanaticism.  From this there is no ultimate salvation but by referring all acts to the final touchstone—­asking which will produce in the end the greatest amount