and the toothache is, among other things, precisely what we mean by “bad,” just as the look of the cloudless sky by daylight is what we mean by “blue.”] To call love good is not to give an opinion, it is to describe a fact.  It is a matter of direct first-hand feeling, whose reality consists in its being felt.  To say that these experiences are good or bad is equivalent to saying that they feel good or bad; there can be no dispute about it.  This is the bottom fact of ethics.  Different experiences have different intrinsic worth as they pass.  There is a chiaroscuro of consciousness, a light and shade of immediate goodness and badness over all our variegated moments.  The good moments are their own excuse for being, a part of the brightness and worth of life.  They need nothing ulterior to justify them.  The bad moments feel bad, and that is the end of it; they are bad-feeling moments, and no sophistication can deny it.  Conscious life looked at from this point of view, and abstracted from all its other aspects, is a flux of plus and minus values.  Certain of its moments have a greater felt worth than others; some experiences are intrinsically undesirable, the shadows of life; others, intrinsically sweet, a part of its sunshine.  In the last analysis, all differences in value, including all moral distinctions, rest upon this disparity in the immediate worth of conscious states. [Footnote:  Cf.  G. Santayana, The Sense of Beauty, p. 104:  “All worth leads us back to actual feeling somewhere, or else evaporates into nothing-into a word and a superstition.”  I cannot but feel that contemporary definitions of value that omit reference to hedonic differences e.g. that of Professor Brown (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, vol.  II, p. 32):  “Value is degree of adequacy of a potentiality to the realization of the effect by virtue of which it is a potentiality"-miss the real meaning of “value.”  We do, indeed, speak occasionally of x as having value as a means to y, when y is not good or a means to a good.  But that seems to me a misuse of the word.] We may say absolutely that if it were not for this fundamental difference in feeling there would be no such thing as morality.  There might conceivably be a world in which consciousness should exist without any agreeable or disagreeable qualities; in such a world nothing would matter; all acts would be equally indifferent.  Or there might be a world in which all experiences were equally pleasurable or painful; in such a case all acts would be equally good or equally sad; there would be no ground for choice.  One might in any of these hypothetical worlds be driven by mechanical impulse or fitful whim to do this or that, but there would be no rational basis for preference.  Such, however, is not the case.  Comparative valuation is possible; all secondary goods and evils arise, all morality, all art and religion and science have their wellspring in this brute fact, this primordial