F. Paulsen, System of Ethics, book ii, chap. V, secs. 1, 2, 5. H. Spencer, data of ethics, chap. VII, secs. 44-46. S. E. Mezes, ethics, descriptive and explanatory, chaps. V, VIII. Sutherland, op. cit, chap. XV. F. Thilly, introduction to ethics, chap. III. Westermarck, op. cit, chap. V. Darwin, descent of man, partt. I, chap. III. J. H. Hyslop, elements of ethics, chaps. VI, vii. J. S. Mill, utilitarianism, chap. v. H. W. Wright, self-realization, part. I, chap. IV.
CHAPTER V
THE INDIVIDUALIZING OF CONSCIENCE
Conscience as we have seen, is the result of a fusion of elements coming from personal experience and tribal judgment. In its early phases the latter elements predominate; conscience may be fairly called the inner side of custom. Primitive men have little individuality and involuntarily reflect the general attitude. But with widening experience and growing mental maturity, conscience, like man’s other faculties, tends to become more individual and divergent, until we find, in civilized life, a man standing out for conscience’ sake against the opinion of the world. The individualization of conscience, with the consequent clash of ideals, gives the study of morality much of its interest and difficulty; it will be worthwhile to note some of its causes. Why did not the individualizing of conscience occur earlier?
(1) In primitive man there is not much opportunity for the development of individuality. There are few personal possessions, there is little scope for the exercise of peculiar talents, there is little power of reflection, to develop strongly individual ideas. The self-assertive instincts are to considerable extent still dormant for lack of stimulus to call them forth. The individual is content to take his place in the group life, and it seldom occurs to him to question the group-judgment.