(7) Space forbids the further discussion of reforms that aim at improving the machinery of election.  The value of anti-bribery laws is obvious, as of the laws that require publicity of campaign accounts, forbid campaign contributions by corporations, and limit the legal expenditures of individuals. [Footnote:  Cf.  Outlook, vol. 81, p. 549.] The publication at public expense and sending to every voter of a pamphlet giving in his own words the arguments on the strength of which each candidate seeks election has recently been tried in the West.  But this is sure, that in one way or other the American people will evolve a mechanism which will make it easier for able and honest men to attain office than for the rogues and their incompetent henchmen.

II.  A second set of reforms bears rather upon the quality of legislation than upon the selection of men for office.  It is not enough that the way be made easy for good men to attain office; they must, when elected, be freed from needless temptations and given every inducement to work for the interests of the community they represent.  Every possible pressure is valuable that can counteract the pull of sectional interests, party interests, or the interests of the great corporations, away from the general welfare.  For even the best intentioned officials may yield to the insistence of local or partisan wishes, to the arguments of “big business,” or to the lure of personal advantage.

(1) Representation at large.  The method of legislation by representatives of local districts leads inevitably to laws that are a compromise or bargain between the interests of the several districts, rather than the result of a desire to further the best interests of the entire community.  Congressmen are continually beset by their constituents to secure special favors for them, aldermen are expected to push the interests of their respective wards.  Each representative stands in danger of political suicide if he refuses to use his influence for these often improper ends; and legislation takes the form of a quid pro quo:-"You vote for this bill which my section desires, and I’ll vote for the bill yours demands.”  This evil is so great that it may be necessary eventually to do away entirely with district representation.[Footnote:  See Outlook, vol. 95, p. 759.]

(2) Delegated government.  Another plan, which evades the pressure of local interests while allowing district representation, also avoids the friction and deadlocks which result from government by a group of representatives of sharply opposed parties or principles.  By this plan, a representative body is elected, by districts, or at large, by proportional representation; but this body, instead of itself deciding or executing the state or municipal policy, serves merely to select and watch experts, who carry on the various phases of government.  These experts remain responsible to the representatives, who in turn are