fairly won his position retains it for life, except in case of proved inefficiency.  The quality of the public service has been immeasurably improved, the subservience of office-holders to political chiefs abolished. [Footnote:  See Atlantic Monthly, vol. 113, p. 270.  National Municipal Review, vol. 1, p. 654; vol. 3, p. 316.] But there are still many thousands of offices that have not been brought within the civil service, and there are continual attempts on the part of politicians to withdraw from it this or that class of appointments, that they may have “plums” to offer their constituents.  To the most important positions the civil service method is, however, inapplicable; imagine a President having to appoint as his Secretary of State the man who passed the best examination in diplomacy!  So many other considerations affect the availability of a man for such posts that the elected officials must be given a free hand in their choice and held responsible therefore to the people.  These important appointees will be enough in the public eye to make it usually expedient for the career of the appointers that they pick reasonably honest and able men-especially if the recall (of which we shall presently speak) is in operation.

(2) The short ballot.  As our government has grown more and more complex, the number of officials for whom the citizen must vote has increased, with the result that he has to decide in many cases among rival candidates about none of whom he knows anything definitely.  For four or five offices he can be fairly expected the merits of the candidates in the field; but to investigate or remember the relative merits and demerits of a score or more is more than the average voter will do.  So he may “scratch” his party’s candidate for governor or mayor, but usually votes the “straight ticket” for the minor officials.  This works too well into the hands of the political machines.  The obvious remedy is to give him only a few officers to vote for and to require the remaining offices to be filled by appointment instead of election.

By this method, not only is the voter saved from needless confusion and enabled to concentrate his attention upon the few big offices, but the responsibility for misgovernment is far more clearly fixed, and the possibility of remedying it made much easier.  If a dozen state officials are elected, the average citizen is uncertain who is to blame for inefficiency; each official shoves the responsibility on to the others’ shoulders, and it is not plain what can be done except to depose them all, one by one.  If a governor only is elected, and is required to appoint his subordinates, the entire blame rests upon his shoulders.  If dishonesty or misadministration is discovered, he must take the shame; he may be recalled from office if he is not quick enough in removing the guilty man and remedying the evil.