The line between mere habits or manners and morals is differently drawn in different times and places, according to the differing ideas as to what matters.  The same actions which are moral to one community ( i.e, arouse feelings or judgments of commendation) may be immoral to another community ( i.e., arouse reprobation or scorn) and non-moral to a third ( i.e., arouse no such response at all).  For example, in one tribe tattooing may be a mere matter of personal liking, of no importance and with no group-judgment upon it; yet certain habits with regard to it may become widespread.  In another tribe certain tattoos may be thought to be enjoined by the god, and their neglect deemed a matter of serious importance to the tribe as a whole; tattooing may here be said to be a part of the tribal morals.  To us moderns it is probably a morally indifferent affair; but if we should learn it to be seriously deleterious to the body, it would again become a moral matter.  In short, morals are customs that affect, or are supposed to affect, a man’s life or that of his tribe for weal or woe.  Obviously, this discrimination is not consciously made by savages; indeed, to this day, such distinctions are enveloped in a haze for the average man.  Men do not realize the raison d’etre of morals.  They follow them because their fathers did or their fellows do; because they inherit instincts that drive them in their direction or inevitably imitate those who have formed the habits before; because they feel a pressure toward them and are uncomfortable if they hold out against it.  When pressed for a justification of their conduct, they are usually surprised at the inquiry; such action seems obviously the thing to do, and that is the end of it.  Or they will hit upon some of the secondary sanctions that have grown up about these habits the penalties of the law, the commandment of the gods, or what not.  But with our resources of analysis and reflection, it is not difficult to discern that the various forces at work have been such as to preserve, in general, habits which made for the welfare of individual or tribe and discard the harmful ones.  It is, then, not merely habits, but habits that matter, moral habits, with whose growth and alteration we are here concerned.  What, in general, has been the direction of moral progress?  We have noted the main causes at work in the production of morality; we now ask in what general direction these forces push.  We have in mind the concrete virtues which have been developed; but what common function have these habits of conduct, so produced, had in human life?  What has been the net result of the process?  At first sight a generalized answer seems impossible.  All sorts of chance causes bring about local alterations in morals.  The momentary dominance of an impulse ordinarily weak, the whim of a ruler, the self-interest of classes, superstitious interpretation of omens, the attribution of some success to a prior act which