is averted by a statement to the audience that one of the actors has fallen ill, and the performance must be ended.  In such cases it is foolish to talk of the possibility of evasion; it is direct misstatement that is necessary to prevent the great evil that knowledge, or even suspicion of the truth, might entail.  Truthfulness under such circumstances, or even the taking of a chance by attempting to effect deception without literal untruth, would be brutal and inexcusable.  As Saleeby puts it, “When the choice is between being a liar or a brute, only brutal people can tell the truth or hesitate to lie — and that right roundly.[Footnote:  Ethics, p. 103.] In such cases the public, including the very people deceived (except the murderer, who deserves no consideration), applaud the lie; no lack of confidence is engendered.  Other cases, less commonly discussed, are equally clear.  A mother has just lost a son whom she has idealized and believed to be pure; his classmates know him to have been a rake.  If she asks them about his character, will not all feel called upon to deceive her, and leave her in her bereavement at least free from that worst sting?  When a timid woman or a sensitive child is alarmed, say, for example, at sea in a fog, will not a considerate companion reiterate assurance that there is little or no danger, even when he himself believes the risk may be great?  When a man is asked about some matter which he has promised to keep secret, if the attempt to evade the question in the nature of the case is practically a letting-out of the secret, there seems sometimes to be hardly an alternative to lying.  Mrs. Gerould puts it thus:  “A question put by some one who has no right to the information demanded, deserves no truth.  If a casual gossip should ask me whether my unmarried great-aunt lived beyond her means, I should feel justified in saying that she did not although it might be the private family scandal that she did.  There are inquiries which are a sort of moral burglary” [Footnote:  In the Atlantic essay referred to at the end of this chapter.  The unassigned quotations following are from that paper, which I am particularly glad to commend after rather curtly criticizing that other essay of hers in the preceding chapter.]

(2) In regard to the little lies which form a part of the conventions of polite society, there may be difference of opinion.  Their aim is to obviate hurting people’s feelings, to oil the wheels of social misled by them.  When asked by one’s hostess if one likes what is apparently the only dish provided, or if one has had enough when one is really still hungry, the average courteous man will murmur a gallant falsehood.  What harm can be done thereby, and why cause her useless embarrassment?  “We simply have to be polite as our race and clime understand politeness, and no one except a naive is really going to take this sort of thing seriously.”  To thank a stupid hostess for the pleasure she has not given, is loving one’s neighbor as one’s